Given an argumentation network we associate with it a modal formula representing the 'logical content' of the network. We show a one-to-one correspondence between all possible complete Caminada labellings of the network and all possible models of the formula.
Introduction
Let P be an argumentation network. The network P has logical contents, saying which arguments are winning (denoted by a is 'on' or a = 1), which are losing (denoted by a is 'off' or a = 0) and which are undecided (denoted by a is 'undecided' or a =?).
The content (or extensions) can be obtained from a Caminada labelling. a b This kind of content depends on an algorithm yielding extensions and there are several types of algorithms, giving several types of extensions. Different networks may admit some extensions and possibly not others.
For example 1. Network P 1 of Figure 1 has no extensions.
2. The network P 2 of Figure 2 has the following types of extensions:
• Grounded: ∅
• Preferred: {a}, {b}
• Complete: ∅, {a}, {b}.
3. The network P 3 of Figure 3 has the following types of extensions:
• Preferred: {a}, {b, d}
4. The network P 4 in Figure 4 has the following types of extensions:
• All types except stable: {b, d} Type 1 Type 0 Type ?
The different extensions can be obtained from a Caminada labelling of the nodes.
Our aim in this paper is to associate with a network P a modal formula m(P) of a certain modal logic (which we call LN1) such that the following hold:
1. The modal formula m(P) contains the nodes of the network P as atomic propositions.
2. The possible worlds models of the modal formula correspond in one to one fashion to the Caminada labelling of the network.
To be specific, consider a three-point linear Kripke model of the form as in Figure 5 .
(i.e. if < is the accessibility relation then we have 1 < 2 < 3). The modal logic LN1 is such that for the Kripke model of Figure 5 above and for any modal formula m(P) for a network P such that m(P) holds in the model, only three types of assignment are possible, as in Figure 6 We named the types by 0, 1, ? to correspond to the Caminada labelling. Any model of m(P) will give truth values to the atoms in each world and the atom will acquire a type. Thus we define a Caminada function f accordingly
Converseley, any Caminada labelling f of P can be turned into an assignment to the Kripke model of Figure 6 via the same correspondence and that will be a model of m(P). Thus the logic LN1 and the formula m(P) contains in it the information of all Caminada labelling for P and therefore all types of extensions are retrievable from it by additional considerations on the models.
The modal logic formula is obtained from general methodological considerations which have nothing directly to do with argumentation. It is not something we 'cooked up' to correspond to the Caminada labelling. Rather, it is a result of general approach to self-referential loops in algorithmic logic, as can be seen from the next section.
Methodological motivation
The modal approach was first introduced by the author in 1986, in an Imperial College technical report [1] and later publsihed in 1990 as [2] .
The problem to be solved was to associate 'logical content' with any Prolog program π with negation as failure, especially for programs which loop.
Example 2.1 Consider the following four programs:
• a if ¬a
The problem with such programs is that they contain loops and it is not clear what they say.
The modal idea was to associate with each program π a formula m(π) of a modal logic N1, see [2] 1 and identify m(π) via a fixed point solution of a
we use the modal logic N1 of finite trees, described in the next section. The case of argumentation networks is much simpler than general logic programs and it is easier to add an axiom of linearity to N1 to obtain LN1 and use the linear version for our purposes. All the fixed points machinery and theorems in [2] apply to LN1 and so we save a lot of work in this paper.
modal equation in the logic N1. The machinery for doing so, including effective tractable algorithms for finding m(π) is presented, motivated and discussed at length in [2] . For our purposes it is enough to explain the idea through one simple example.
We illustrate the idea for the case of the program π 1 (a if ¬a), see [2, Example E4, p. 197] .
Let X 1 be the logical content of the program π 1 . If we understand the modality as 'provable' then
• q loops from π 1 iff neither the above.
Therefore we need to solve something like the following modal fixed point
Considerations in the paper [2] lead us (for technical reasons) to the following exact equations
where Gq = q ∧ q, and is the irreflexive and transitive modality of the logic N1 yet to be introduced. It is proved in [2] that to get a solution X it is enough to substitute ⊤ for X in the right hand side of the equation, i.e.
is a fixed point of equation ( * ).
The connection with argumentation comes through the following translation of an argumentation network into a Prolog program Definition 2.2 Translation τ .
Let P be a network and let y ∈ P.
If no arrow goes into the node y then translate τ (y) = y.
2. If y 1 , . . . , y n are all the nodes with arrows into y then translate
Let π = τ (P) = {τ (y)|y ∈ P }. Then π is the associated Prolog program.
It is easy to see that for the networks P 1 , . . . , P 4 of Figures 1-4 the associated Prolog programs are π 1 , . . . , π 4 . Now using the machinery of [2] we obtain a modal formula m(π) for π giving 'logical content' to π in the logic N1.
This same formula considered in the logic LN1 will give logical content to P.
Of course, in the next sections we will work on P directly and just help ourselves to technical lemmas from [2] .
The modal logic LN1
This section introduces the modal logic N1 of [2] which we use to give modal content to logic programs and consequently to argumentation networks, through its extension LN1. The language contains atoms, the classical connectives and a modality (and hence ♦). The models we envisage for this logic are Kripke models of the form (S, <, a, h) where (S, <, a) is a finite tree with root a ∈ S and h is the assignment, giving each atomic q a subset h(q) ⊆ S.
The following must be satisfied.
1. If all non-endpoints are (resp. are not) in h(q) then h(q) = S (resp. h(q) = ∅). 
Satisfaction is defined in the usual way

the model is an LN1 model if the tree is a linear chain.
Definition 3.2 Axioms for N1
All substitution instances of classical tautologies
2. All substitution instances of modal K4 axioms
All substitution instances of Löb's axiom
4. Axiom for atomic q:
5. Additional axiom of linearity for LN1.
• All substitution instances of
Theorem 3.3 1. N1 is complete for the proposed semantics of finite trees.
LN1 is complete for the proposed semantics of linear finite chains
Proof. Well known. -see [4] Definition 3.4 Let P be an argumentation network. For any node y in P let y 1 , . . . , y n be all the nodes attacking y (i.e. with arrows leading into y). Let
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Let P be a network. Let y ∈ P and let y i , i = 1, . . . , n be all elements attacking y (with arrows leading into y). Let us understand X as the modal 'logical content' of P. Then for any z ∈ P, X proves z if z is 'on' and if z is not 'on' then X∧ ∼ z is consistent. Thus for y to be 'on', we need to have
This holds for any y ∈ P.
If y is not attacked by anything then we want X ⊢ y.
Thus we expect X to satisfy more or less the equation
An extensive technical discussion in [2] shows that the correct equation is the following:
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A sequence of Lemmas in [2] shows (see Lemma L1, page 190), that the solution to the above equation is the formula m(P) of Definition 3.4.
Lemma 3.5 Consider a 3 point LN1 chain model of a formula m(P) of Definition 3.4. Then each atomic q has truth values of type 0 or of type 1 or of type ? of Figure 6.
Proof. The axioms of LN1 force the following for atomic q in the chain 1 < 2 < 3:
• 1 q and 2 q ⇒ 3 q • 1 ∼ q and 2 ∼ q ⇒ 3 ∼ q • 1 q and 2 ∼ q ⇒ 3 q.
We need to prove that the option 1 q and 2 ∼ q and 3 ∼ q cannot arise.
Consider a point y such as y is being attacked. (If not then Gy is in m(P) and so y is of type 1.)
We have G( ⊥ ∨ (y ↔ ♦ ∼ y i )) holds in the model. Hence y ↔ i ♦ ∼ y i holds at points 1 and 2. We distinguish several cases:
1. If for any j, if y j = ⊥ at 3 then ♦ ∼ y j is true at 1 and 2 and it plays no role in the conjunction. If for all y j , 3 ∼ y j then y = ⊤ at 1 and 2 and y is of type 1.
2. Some y j are ⊤ at 3. Then ♦ ∼ y j is ⊥ at 2 and y = ⊥ at 2.
3. We now check whether y j is true or false at 2. If for some j, y j = ⊤ at 2 then ♦ ∼ y j = ⊥ at 1 and y = ⊥ at 1 and hence y = ⊥ everywhere, and hence y is of type 0.
If for all j, y j = ⊥ at 2 then y = ⊤ at 1 and we have that y = ⊤ at 1 and y = ⊥ at 2 and we must have by the axiom 4.1 that 3 y and y is of type 3. We have that m(P) for this figure is:
We can have the assignment of Figure 8 and m(P) still holds. Proof. Direction 1. Let h be an assignment model satisfying m(P). By Lemma 3.5 every atom node x in P gets assigned values h(x) of types 0, 1, or ?.
Define a Caminada candidate function f according to the types, namely f (x) = i iff h(x) is of type i, i ∈ {0, 1, ?}. We now show 1 If x is an initial point then Gx is a conjunct of m(P ), therefore h(x) is of type 1 and hence f (x) = 1.
2 If y 1 , . . . , y n are all nodes with arrows to y, then we have the conjunct y ↔ i ♦ ∼ y i in m(P) in the clause
This means that at nodes 1 and 2 of the chain y ↔ i ♦ ∼ y i must hold. Assume all y i are of type 0, then y = ⊤ at 2 and 1. Hence by axiom 4.2, y = ⊤ also at node 3 and y is of type If one of y i is of type 1, this means ♦ ∼ y i is ⊥ at 1 and 2. Hence i ♦ ∼ y i is ⊥ at 1 and 2. But also since f (y i ) = 1, we get f (y) = 0 and so y is of type 0 and y = ⊥ at 1 and 2.
Type 1 Type 0 Type ? Type?* 3
Hence y ↔ i ♦ ∼ y i holds at 1 and 2. Now assume that all y i are either of type 0 or type ?. This means f (y i ) is either 0 or ?. Assume that at least one y i is of type ? (i.e. f (y i ) =?). Then f (y) =? and we have y = ⊤ at 1 and y = ⊥ at 2. Let us check whether i ♦ ∼ y i is ⊥ at and ⊤ at 2. Since all y i are of type ? or ⊥ with at least one y i of type ?, the type ? y i will be ⊤ at node 2 and hence ♦ ∼ y i = ⊥ at node 1 and hence y = ⊥ at node 1.
On the other hand all y i are ⊥ at node 3 and hence i ♦ ∼ y i is ⊤ at node 2. This shows that y ↔ i ♦ ∼ y i is ⊤ at nodes 1 and 2.
Thus the above argument shows that
holds at all nodes 1, 2, and 3.
This completes the proof of the theorem. Figure 7 and Figure 10 . Figure 10 has the m(P) as 1. The modal approach associates a modal formula m(P) with every argumentation network P. Thus we can define the concept of one network P 2 being a logical extension of another network P 1 . We simply say that for all x m(P 1 ) ⊢ x implies m(P 2 ) ⊢ x or equivalently m(P 2 ) ⊢ m(P 1 ).
There is no simple way of defining this concpet directly in network terms.
Another option avaialble to us is the logical characterisation of extensions.
We saw that following Definition 1.1 that the different labellig options f for P, corresponds to all the models for m(P) and that the various extensions can be characterised by properties of f and the sets E and E 0 f and is unique. Therefore it can be characterised using the modal logic LN1 as the set of all literals z = x and z =∼ x such that m(P) ⊢ z.
